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Abstract  
The signing of the ‘Framework Agreement’ between the Government of India (GOI) and the 
National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isaac-Muivah) on 3 August 2015 that pledges to restore 
‘pride and prestige’ of the Nagas takes place after more than six-and-a-half-decades of violence 
and militarisation of the Naga society. The Agreement has been signed at a moment when the 
Naga society is marked by enormous fragmentation from within. While, the GOI through the 
creation of the state of Nagaland in 1963 and other initiatives created a local ruling class opposed 
to long-cherished Nagas’ demand for sovereignty; on the other hand, the tribes-centric 
proliferation of various insurgent outfits has created hostilities within the Naga society. The 
continuance of security apparatuses like Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), 1958 and 
that of the top-down development paradigm has been in contrast to the social and cultural 
dynamics of the Naga society. The recent Accord, which has remained silent on those issues, 
however, has shifted the Naga national discourse from exclusive sovereignty of the Nagas in 
Nagaland to that of shared sovereignty of the Nagas within the Union of India. While, there have 
been celebrations of the Accord among the civil society forces in Nagaland spearheaded by Naga 
Hoho who for long have endeavoured to sustain ceasefires between GOI and the insurgent outfits 
in the state, there have, however, been serious reservations in regard to the efficacy of the Accord 
to restore peace, harmony and national pride among the Nagas. 
Key words: Naga National Council (NNC), National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), 
Government of India (GOI), Naga Hoho, Phizo, Muivah 
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Introduction 
Signing of the ‘Framework Agreement’ between 
Government of India (GOI) and National 
Socialist Council of Nagaland led by Isaac and 
Muivah faction (NSCN-IM) on 3 August  2015 is 
perceived as a step towards restoration of 
peace in Nagaland in India, however, without 
any guarantee that it will bring permanent 
solution to the Naga national question. The 
‘Framework Agreement’ has been marked by 
secrecy and suspicion as both the parties have 
refused to divulge the details of the Agreement. 
Besides, the much-talked about ‘unique history 
and culture’ of the Nagas by the Prime Minister 
of India on the occasion of signing the 
Agreement mismatch both with the 
development paradigm and security 
apparatuses of the GOI being in operation in 
Nagaland for decades together. The signing of 
the Agreement, which has been received 
positively by most of the civil society outfits in 
the state steered by Naga Hoho is a significant 
marker of the legitimacy for the Indian state. 
The more than six-decades-long Naga’s struggle 
for sovereignty was based on the presumed 
illegitimacy of the Indian state in Nagaland, 
which was reiterated both by the NNC-
sponsored plebiscite in 1951 and mass boycott 
of the first General Elections in independent 
India, 1952. Attempts were made from time to 
time to resolve the ‘Naga National’ question, 
which is based on Naga’s uncompromising 
conviction about the unique history and culture 
of the Nagas that can be protected only 
through inalienable sovereign rights in the 
hands of the Nagas themselves. While, through 
a number of accords and agreements, GOI 
expressed its willingness to extend maximum 
autonomy to the Nagas to preserve and protect 
their unique history and culture; however, the 
same was rejected by the Naga outfits—both 
Naga National Council (NNC) as well as National 
Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in the 
pretext that autonomy of whatever kind was 
far short of sovereignty. GOI on its part 
succeeded in penetrating into the Naga society 
by creating a local ruling class through the 
creation of Nagaland as a separate state within 
the Indian Union in 1963 and also pumping of 
huge funds to the state. The Naga society, on 
the other hand, witnessed fragmentation 
around tribes and clans, and inter- and intra-
factionalism have emerged as regular feature of 
the Naga national struggle. Not only NSCN 
emerged from within the womb of NNC as a 
dissident force, but also NSCN itself got 
fragmented into two factions subsequently 
which have proved to be the fierce enemies of 
each other. In 1997, GOI signed a ceasefire 
agreement with NSCN (IM) and in 2001, the 
GOI signed another ceasefire agreement with 
NSCN (K), but that has not resolved the clashes 
between these two outfits. It is in such a 
context that the ‘Framework Agreement’ has 
been signed, which has supposed to have 
marked ‘not merely the end of a problem, but 
the beginning of a new future.’ Through the 
Agreement, GOI has also pledged not only to 
‘try to heal wounds and resolve problems’, but 
also to be their ‘partner’ as the Nagas restore 
their ‘pride and prestige’ (Modi, 2015,quoted 
from Nagaland Post, August 4). However, it is 
much under doubt whether such a ‘Framework 
Agreement,’ which recognises ‘unique history 
and culture of the Nagas’ but does not work out 
either to bring reconciliation within Naga 
factions or to do away with the coercive 
apparatuses like Armed Forces Special Powers 
Act (AFSPA), 19581 can really restore peace and 
pride in the Naga Hills.  
                                                          
1 Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 was imposed 
by the colonial regime in India in the form of an 
ordinance to suppress the peoples’ upsurge during Quit 
India Movement in 1942. After Independence when 
insurgency started in Northeast India, GOI, in the pretext 
that states in Northeast India has failed to deal with 
internal disturbances, promulgated the Armed Forces 
(Special Powers) Ordinance on 22nd May 1958. It was 
enacted as an Act of GOI in September 1958. Under the 
Act, the armed forces enjoy extra ordinary power of 
using force including firing upon even to the extent of 
causing death for maintenance of public order. The Act 
has remained an issue of contention in the region and 
has alleged to violate human rights enormously.  
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Naga National Struggle and Responses of the 
Indian State 
The potentiality of the ‘Framework Agreement’ 
to restore peace in Nagaland needs to be 
examined by a critical scrutiny of the historical 
dynamics of growth, evolution and 
contradictions of Naga national struggle. Naga 
nationality consciousness is a 20th Century 
phenomena, which has posed one of the 
serious challenges to the nation-building 
process since India’s independence on 15 
August 1947. On that day, the Nagas too 
declared its independence under the leadership 
of A. Z. Phizo—the legendary figure in Naga 
national struggle. The Naga club formed in 1918 
is a precursor in regard to the formation of 
Naga national consciousness, and the first 
significant manifestation of the same was 
evident in the memorandum submitted by 
Naga Club to the Simon Commission in 1929, 
which was ‘considering political reforms in India 
to respond to rising Indian anti-colonial 
mobilization’ (Baruah, 2005: 11). Through the 
memorandum, the Club demanded that ‘the 
Nagas be excluded from the proposed 
constitutional changes and kept under the 
direct administration of the British’ and also 
stated: ‘[y]ou (the British) are the only people 
who conquered us and when you go we should 
be as we were’ (Misra, 2000: 28). The first 
official attempt to provide Nagas a separate 
political entity was the creation of Naga Hills 
District Tribal Council in 1945 at the initiative of 
the British Deputy Commissioner of the Naga 
Hills district, Charles Pawsey. However, Naga 
politics took a concrete shape only with the 
formation of the Naga National Council (NNC) 
in February 1946, which brought together all 
individual tribes of the Nagas. There was no 
unanimity within the NNC in regard to its 
political demands, that is, whether to go in for 
autonomy or sovereignty in the initial years.  
However, with the election of Phizo as the 
President of NNC in November 1949, the 
demand for independence gained momentum, 
although Phizo declared Nagas independence 
on 15 August 1947 itself. He also very tactfully 
penetrated into the traditional tribal power 
structures of the Nagas to widen the roots and 
spread of the NNC. 
Before India had achieved independence, the 
NNC’s official stand was for autonomy within 
the Indian Constitution and not secession or 
sovereignty. On the eve of the declaration of 
the Cabinet Mission Grouping Proposal,2 the 
NNC in June 1946 demanded autonomy within 
Assam and opposed both the proposal for a 
Crown Colony as well as the Grouping Scheme 
(Misra, 2000: 27). Stating its political position, 
the General Secretary of NNC, T. Sakhrie in a 
letter written to Jawaharlal Nehru stated: “(a) 
the Naga National Council stands for the 
solidarity of all Naga tribes including those in 
the un-administered areas; (b) this council 
strongly protests against the grouping of Assam 
with Bengal; (c) the Naga Hills should be 
constitutionally included in autonomous Assam, 
in a free India, with local autonomy and due 
safeguards for the interests of Nagas; and (d) 
                                                          
2 Cabinet Mission Proposal, 1946 was an attempt to 
transfer power to India by negotiating with two main 
political parties i.e. Congress and the Muslim League. 
However, the Mission failed to bring together both the 
parities for any agreement and therefore declared its 
own scheme ‘to ensure a speedy setting up of the new 
constitution’. While considering the Muslim League’s 
claim for an independent and sovereign state of Pakistan 
to be constituted by six states, including Assam, the 
Mission looked at the religious composition of those 
states. Based on the religious figures, it commented that 
the setting up of a separate sovereign state of Pakistan as 
claimed by the League would not solve the communal 
minority problem, as there were non-Muslim majority 
districts in Punjab and Bengal and in Assam. Accordingly, 
through its 16 May, 1946 Statement, the Cabinet Mission 
had put forward its plan under which ‘the 
representatives of the provinces were to divide 
themselves into three sections - A, B, and C, after 
preliminary session of the proposed Constituent 
Assembly was over. Section C was to consist of Bengal 
and Assam. Each section was to decide its own provincial 
and group matters. A province was free to opt out of its 
allotted section only after the first elections under the 
new constitution was over’ (Guha, 2014: 253). This 
Grouping proposal was vehemently opposed by Assam 
with the apprehension that under this plan Assam’s fate 
will be decided by a Muslim majority Group. The Group 
consisted of total 70 members out of which 34 were 
General and 36 Muslim. However, out of 10 members of 
Assam 7 were General and 3 Muslim.  
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the Naga tribes should have a separate 
electorate” (NNC Resolution 19 June 1946, 
quoted from Nag, 2009: 49).  
Response of Nehru to this letter was not only 
positive, but also prospective. While Nehru was 
for greater autonomy for the Nagas, he was 
opposed to sovereignty and secession of the 
Nagas from India. The letter, indeed, laid down 
the political philosophy of the incoming Indian 
state to the whole Naga issue. It is worth 
quoting the following portion of the letter 
written by Nehru.   
It is obvious that the Naga territory in 
eastern Assam is much too small to 
stand by itself, politically or 
economically. It lies between two huge 
countries India and China and part of it 
consists of rather backward people who 
require considerable help. When India is 
independent, as it is bound to be soon, 
it will not be possible for the British 
government to hold on the Naga 
territory. It must form part of India and 
of Assam with which it has developed 
much close association. At the same 
time it is our policy that tribal areas 
should have as much freedom   and 
autonomy as possible so that they can 
live their own lives according to their 
own customs and desires. […]The whole 
Naga territory should go together and 
should be controlled in a large measure 
by an elected Naga National Council. 
[…]I agree entirely with your decision 
that the Naga Hills should 
constitutionally be included in an 
autonomous Assam in a free India, with 
local autonomy and due safeguards for 
the interest of the Nagas. […]I see no 
reason whatever why an extraneous 
judicial system should be enforced upon 
the Naga Hills. They should have perfect 
freedom to continue their village 
panchayats, tribal courts, etc., according 
to their own wishes. […]. Certainly, the 
people of the Naga Hills should not be 
exploited by others and their right to 
own and work on the soil should remain 
with them… I do not want them to be 
swamped by people from other parts of 
the country who might go there to 
exploit them to their own advantage 
(Jawaharlal Nehru to Sakhrie, 6 August 
1946 quoted from Nag, 2009: 49)   
It may be argued that it was in conformity with 
the spirit of the Nehru’s letter that the Naga-
Akbar Hydari Accord was signed in June 1947.  
It was a 9-point Accord signed between the 
then Governor of Assam, Sir Akbar Hydari and 
the representatives of the Naga National 
Council at Kohima after three days of discussion 
from 26-28 June 1947. It is worth mentioning 
here that ten tribes participated in this 
discussion that included the Western Angamis, 
Eastern Angamis, Kukis, Kacha Nagas (Mzemi), 
Rengmas, Semas, Lothas, Aos, Sangtams and 
Changs. Through this Agreement, which was 
signed for a period of ten years, ‘the right of 
the Nagas to develop themselves according to 
their freely expressed wishes’ was recognised. 
On judicial matters, the agreement recognised 
duly constituted ‘Naga Courts according to the 
Naga customary law’. The Accord ensured 
complete authority of the Council on 
agriculture. It was also stated in the Accord that 
‘no laws passed by the Provincial or Central 
Legislatures, which would materially affect the 
terms of the agreement or the religious 
practices shall have legal force in Naga Hills 
without the consent of the Naga Council.’ In 
other words, Naga Council was accorded a legal 
and statutory recognition by this Accord.     
 Article 9 of the Agreement became a point of 
contention, which was about the Period of 
Agreement. It reads: ‘[t]he Governor of Assam 
as the Agent of the Government of the Indian 
Union will have a special responsibility for a 
period of 10 years to ensure the due 
observance of this agreement; at the end of the 
period the Naga Council will be asked whether 
they require the above agreement to be 
extended for a further period or a new 
agreement regarding the future of Naga people 
arrived at.’  
Initially, the NNC approved of this Accord. 
However, it did not take time to surface 
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dissents within NNC and Article 9 was the most 
contentious in this regard. It was interpreted by 
those who opposed the Accord that ‘[a] Article 
9 actually gave the Nagas the right to complete 
independence, once the interim period of ten 
years was over. This was not acceptable to 
Indian Government which insisted that this 
Article gave the Nagas the right to suggest 
administrative change within the Indian Union 
but not that of secession’ (Misra, 2000: 33). The 
faction led by Phizo was opposed to the Accord 
and their meeting with Gandhi on 19 July 1947 
wherein Gandhi said that ‘[t]he Nagas have 
every right to become independent…. If you do 
not wish to join the Union of India, nobody will 
force you’ (Misra, 2000: 33) only reassured 
Phizo of his conviction of Naga’s right to 
independence. On 15 August 1947, Phizo 
declared independence of Nagaland. With 
Phizo’s election to the post of President of NNC 
in November 1949, the demand and 
enthusiasm for independence gained 
momentum. Under Phizo’s leadership, the 
‘plebiscite’ for Naga independence was 
organized during May-August 1951 followed by 
the boycott of General Elections, 1952. With 
Phizo’s tactics of accommodating tribal councils 
and the chiefs, he could indeed muster 
overwhelming support of the Nagas on both 
the occasions (Misra, 2000: 34-35). 
Nagas’ claim over sovereignty lies in its 
conviction that they constitute a distinct 
nationalism. Misra quotes Phizo to understand 
Nagas’ perception of its uniqueness to 
constitute itself as a nation.   
Truly, we are a peculiar people. We are 
all equals. Men and women have an 
equal status. We have no caste 
divisions….no high class or low class of 
people…We believe in that form of 
democratic government which permits 
the rule not of the majority but of the 
people as a whole. We have no land tax, 
no wine tax, no water tax. Forests, rivers 
and woodland belong to the people for 
their exploitation without paying 
taxes.… We have no beggars…. And 
wonders of wonders, we have no jails. 
We do not ‘arrest’ or ‘imprison’ 
anybody…. We fear nobody, individually 
or collectively. We are a healthy people 
and fear corrupts the health of man…. 
We talk freely, live freely and fight 
freely too. We have no inhibitions of 
any kind…. Wild? Yes … But free. There 
is order in this chaos, law in this 
freedom. If we were to choose a 
country, it would be my Nagaland, my 
fair Nagaland - again and again. (Misra, 
2000: 47) 
Split in NNC occurred on the issue of autonomy 
versus independence. While Phizo remained 
steadfast to his demand for sovereignty, his 
close confidants like T. Sakhrie and Zasokie had 
left the Council with their differences on the 
issue. The division within NNC resulted in the 
‘Sixteen Point Agreement Arrived at Between 
the Naga Peoples’ Convention and the 
Government of India’ in July 1960. It is through 
this Agreement that a consensus was arrived at 
to constitute a state in the territories known as 
Naga Hills Tuensang Area. It was also decided 
that the state of Nagaland shall be under the 
Ministry of External Affairs of GOI. A number of 
concessions were accorded to the state of 
Nagaland to substantiate the autonomy that 
was promised by the GOI. Clause 7 of the 
Agreement reads:  
“No Act or Law passed by the Union Parliament 
affecting the following provisions shall have 
legal force in the Nagaland unless specifically 
approved by a majority of vote of the Nagaland 
Legislative Assembly: 
 The Religious or Social Practices of the 
Nagas.  
 Naga Customary Laws and Procedure 
 Civil and criminal justice so far as these 
concern decisions according to Naga 
customary law. The existing laws 
relating to administration of civil and 
criminal justice as provided in the Rules 
for the Administration of Justice and 
Police in the Naga Hills district shall 
continue to be in force. 
 The ownership and transfer of land and 
its resources.”  
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Apart from giving special responsibility to the 
Governor in regard to law and order situation 
during the transitional phase, there were 
special provisions of accommodating both 
nominated members representing different 
tribes apart from the elected ones in the state 
legislature. In case of administering the 
Tuensang district, the Governor was assigned 
with special responsibility, and it was stated 
that it is the regional council of the district, 
which will elect members to the state 
legislature from the district. There were also 
demands for amalgamation of the contiguous 
areas inhabited by the Nagas to the new state, 
on which, however, GOI declined to make a 
commitment. The Constitution (Thirteenth 
Amendment) Act, 1962, through which the 
state of Nagaland was created, incorporated 
the important provisions of the Sixteen Point 
Agreement, 1960. The state of Nagaland was 
finally inaugurated in December, 1963.  
Formation of the state of Nagaland was 
followed by the constitution of the Peace 
Mission so as to negotiate with the 
underground and restore peace in Nagaland. 
The Mission was headed by the then Chief 
Minister of Assam, B.P. Chaliha. The other two 
members of the Mission were J.P. Narayan and 
Revd. Michael Scott. The 17-point proposals 
issued by the Peace Mission on 20th December 
1964 were indeed a breakthrough in terms of 
negotiation between the GOI and the 
underground. The Mission officially recorded 
the positions of both the Federal Delegation 
representing the underground which claimed 
that ‘the Nagas had never been conquered by 
the Indian Army or ruled by an Indian 
Government’ (Point 5) and therefore, 
demanded the recognition of Naga’s 
independence and also that of GOI which 
asserted that ‘Nagaland formed an integral part 
of India before 1947 and that with the transfer 
of Power to India by the British Parliament; 
Nagaland became a part of India’(Point 6).  The 
Mission categorically ‘agrees and endorses the 
principle that all subject peoples’ have the right 
to self-determination’ (Point 10) and also 
‘appreciates and understands the desire of the 
Nagas for self-determination and their urge to 
preserve their integrity’ (Point 12). At the same 
time, it draws the attention of the FGN (Federal 
Government of Nagaland) to the historical 
circumstances which gave birth to the Indian 
Union. With its assertion that “...in 1947, when 
all the diverse people of India, who had been 
brought under British rule, voluntarily agreed to 
form Union of India…’(Point 12), the Mission 
also hinted at un-sustainability of the Nagas 
demand on exclusive sovereignty.    
The Mission Proposals suggested both the 
parties for serious engagements. ‘...the NFG 
could, on their own volition, decide to be a 
participant in the Union of India and mutually 
settle the terms and conditions for that 
purpose. On the other hand, the Government 
of India could consider to what extent the 
pattern and structures of the relationship 
between the Nagaland and the Government of 
India should be adapted and recast, so as to 
satisfy the political aspirations of all sections of 
Naga opinion and to make it possible for the 
ideals of peace as expressed in the Naga Peace 
Declaration to be substantially realized’ (Point 
13). In retrospect, it may be argued that the 
much proclaimed ‘Framework Agreement’ of 
2015 is far short of what was envisioned in 
1964. The Peace Mission’s credible success was 
to sign the first ever Cease-Fire Agreement on 6 
September 1964 with Naga Underground 
which, according to the Mission, has been ‘a 
matter of considerable satisfaction to the Peace 
Mission, as to all other in Nagaland and in the 
rest of India, that since firing ceased on 6th 
September, 1964, for the first time in ten years 
people in Nagaland are experiencing what 
normalcy is’ (Point 1). 
However, the Mission initiatives failed once 
‘the Federal Group started violating in terms of 
the stoppage of operations’ (White Paper 
issued by Government of Nagaland, 31 August 
1972). It was alleged that the Federal 
Government sent groups of its cadres to 
Communist China both for military training and 
also for modern sophisticated arms. In August 
1967, Mr. A.Z. Phizo and his host Advisor Revd. 
Michael Scott were alleged to have gone to 
New York to table the Naga case in the United 
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Nations, which they failed to do so. It may be 
mentioned that in 1967, the Indian Parliament 
also enacted ‘The Unlawful Activities 
(Prevention) Act. On 31 August 1972, the 
Governor of Nagaland suspended the practice 
of extension of suspension of military 
operations and declared NNC, NFG and Naga 
Federal Army (NFA) as unlawful associations 
within the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 
of 1967.  
NNC, which declared popular sovereignty in 
1956, also adopted a provisional Constitution of 
the Federal Government called The Yahzabo of 
Nagaland in 1963. After its disillusionment with 
the peace initiatives, the Constitution was 
amended in 1968. Divided into twelve parts and 
having 140 articles, the Yehzabo declares that 
‘[t]here shall be but one citizenship throughout 
Nagaland, that is to say, there shall be no 
citizenship of the Unit as distinct from that of 
the Nation’ (Article 9). While through the 
Yehzabo the people of Nagaland solemnly 
acknowledge that ‘the sovereignty over this 
earth and the entire universe belongs to 
almighty God alone’, it, however, recognises 
that both Christianity and Naga religion as 
religions of the state. Yehzabo of 1968 also 
proclaims to establish national institutions in 
Nagaland based on ‘the common ideals of 
democracy, justice, liberty, equality and 
fraternity among the people composing it.’  
The GOI on its own continued with its attempts 
to bring in peace through tactical manoeuvres 
by creating divisions within the rank and file of 
the underground. As a sequence of events on 
11 November 1975 ‘Nagaland Accord: The 
Shillong Agreement’ was signed between the 
Governor of Assam, L.P. Singh and the 
representatives of Nagaland’s underground 
organisations. Two significant outcomes of the 
Agreement were the following:  
 The representatives of the underground 
organization conveyed their decision, of 
their own volition, to accept, without 
condition, the Constitution of India. 
 It was agreed that the arms, now 
underground, would be brought out and 
deposited at appointed places. 
It was this Accord, which resulted in the revolt 
against NNC and the birth of NSCN in 1980. It is 
to be mentioned here that it was Phizo who 
‘instilled a sense of nationhood among the 
Naga people’; who, however, has also been 
accused of being instrumental towards 
‘reassertion of tribalism in some of its worst 
forms in Naga politics by catering primarily to 
Angami chauvinism and exclusiveness’ (Misra, 
2000: 49). NSCN, in its Manifesto, 1980 
acknowledges the NNC ‘as the only authentic 
political organization of the people of 
Nagaland’ which ‘boldly took up the historic 
national trust, that is, the safeguarding of the 
right to sovereign existence of Nagaland’. 
However, NSCN condemns NNC of ‘its failure to 
condemn the treacherous Ministry and the 
Accord of treason of 1975’ and alleges that 
despite the changes taking place in the world 
‘the Naga National Council has failed to keep 
pace with changing conditions. It has not 
understood the world of Nagaland; it has 
isolated from the people.’ In its Manifesto of 
1980, NSCN has unequivocally declared that 
‘[n]othing is more inalienable for a nation, big 
or small, then her sovereignty’.  It also asserts 
that NSCN stand for ‘the unequivocal sovereign 
right of the Naga people over every inch of 
Nagaland whatever it may be and admit of no 
other existence whatsoever’. NSCN proclaims 
to have stood for ‘principle of Peoples’ 
supremacy’ and in economic system for 
‘Socialism’. On religion, NSCN declares that 
‘Nagaland for Christ’ with an assertion that that 
there will be no restriction on individual 
freedom of religion. In its 1984 statement, 
NSCN described A.Z. Phizo both ‘treacherous’ 
and a ‘perishing’ force’ and calls itself 
‘vigorously risen forces’.  
With the formation of NSCN in 1980, all the 
initiatives undertaken towards peace whether 
through the Peace Mission Proposals, 1964 or 
Shillong Accord, 1975 were proved to be 
unsustainable. New waves of conflict, clashes 
and confrontation started. However, the worst 
was yet to come, and finally it came with the 
division in NSCN itself into two factions one led 
by Chairman Isac and General Secretary Muivah 
(NSCN-IM) and other faction by its Vice 
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President S.S. Khaplang (NSCN-K). The worst 
incident took place on 30 April 1988 in which 
Khaplang faction attacked the General 
Headquarters of Muivah group and killed 
around hundred people. This was indeed one of 
the bloodiest internal clashes in the history of 
Naga national struggle. This was also the worst 
form of outburst of the factionalism between 
the Myanmar Nagas represented by Khaplang 
and that of Tangkhul Naga represented by Isaac 
and Muivah. NSCN (IM) accused the Khaplang 
faction of getting patronage from the Burmese 
forces in its attack on the NSCN headquarters 
on 30 April 1988 (Misra, 2000: 54). While Naga-
Kuki clash has posed serious threat to NSCN as 
an apex revolutionary outfit, it is with the 
initiative of NSCN Khaplang faction that Indo 
Burma Revolutionary Front (IBRF) was formed 
in 1992. This outfit now acts as an apex body of 
many insurgent outfits of Northeast India and 
as adversary to NSCN (IM). The demand for 
Greater Nagalim by NSCN (IM) that 
incorporates substantial parts of Assam and 
Manipur naturally alienated several leading 
insurgent groups of Northeast India from its 
fold. This has also arrested NSCN (IM)’s 
hegemonic role in northeastern insurgency 
forcing it to go in a negotiated settlement of 
the Naga issue (Misra, 2000: 58). It is under 
such compelling circumstances that NSCN (IM) 
signed the ceasefire agreement with the GOI in 
December 1997, which was revised in January 
2001. Subsequently, NSCN (Khaplang) also 
signed a ceasefire agreement for a period of 
one year in May 2001, which was extended 
from time to time. However, the negotiation 
for peace continued primarily with NSCN (IM), 
which finally culminated in the signing of the 
‘Framework Agreement’ in August 2015.  
The Framework Agreement and Prospects of 
Naga Peace  
There has been a marked change in the 
language of NSCN (IM) in the recent past, 
particularly after it has signed the ‘Framework 
Agreement’. Whilst it talked about inalienable 
sovereign rights of the Nagas in its Manifesto, 
1980 and described all others who 
compromised on it as traitors, now NSCN (IM) 
insists on ‘coexistence’ as the only way to 
resolve the Naga national question. ‘Shared 
sovereignty’ emerged as a new language. 
Understanding the problems of both the sides, 
that is, that  of the GOI and the NSCN (IM) with 
mutual appreciation also appears to have led 
towards the signing of the Agreement. ‘Self-
destruction’ is also a new reference point for 
the NSCN (IM) now and pledges to avoid it so as 
to bring about solution to the Naga national 
question. NSCN (IM) is also prepared to avoid a 
confrontationist approach and to go in for 
dialogue and accommodation. These are 
evident in the words of Muivah in his first 
public appearance in Dimapur, Nagaland on 12 
August 2015 after signing the ‘Framework 
Agreement’ (Nagaland Post, 13 August 2015). It 
is also noteworthy that both the NSCN (IM) and 
the GOI are mutually saluting each other after 
signing the Agreement.  
Immediately, after signing the ‘Framework 
Agreement’, Prime Minister Narendra Modi 
delivered a well-scripted speech where he 
focused on the unique history of the Nagas as 
well as the prospects of a new dawn of hope 
and aspirations for both the Nagas and the 
country. For him, the Agreement does not only 
mark ‘the end of a problem, but the beginning 
of a new future’. Through the Agreement, the 
GOI assures its pledge not only ‘to heal wounds 
and resolve problems’ but also to be the 
partner of the Nagas in their ‘pride and 
prestige’. To the leaders and the people of 
Nagaland, the Prime Minister had a special 
message ‘[y]ou will not only build a bright 
future for Nagaland, but your talents, traditions 
and efforts will also contribute to making the 
nation stronger, more secure, more inclusive 
and more prosperous. You are also the 
guardians of our eastern frontiers and our 
gateway to the world beyond” (Nagaland Post, 
4 August 2015). Highlighting the spirit behind 
the negotiations that resulted in the signing of 
the Agreement, the Prime Minister also 
asserted that ‘[t]oday’s agreement is a shining 
example of what we can achieve when we deal 
with each other in a spirit of equality and 
respect, trust and confidence; when we seek to 
understand concerns and try to address 
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aspirations; when we leave the path of dispute 
and take the high road of dialogue. It is a lesson 
and an inspiration in our troubled world’ 
(Nagaland Post, 4 August 2015). Pouring praise 
over the culture and the way of life of the 
Nagas and its significance for India and the 
world, Modi pointed out that ‘I have travelled 
to Nagaland on many occasions. I have been 
deeply impressed by the rich and diverse 
culture and the unique way of life of the Naga 
people. It makes not only our nation, but also 
the world a more beautiful place’ (Nagaland 
Post, 4 August 2015). 
There is indeed convergence in thinking 
between the parties. In Muivah’s words 
‘...when Indians recognised the rights of the 
Nagas and Nagas too understood their 
difficulties, both cannot live totally separated 
but should coexist through sharing of sovereign 
power’ (Nagaland Post, 13 August 2015). On 
the aspect of democracy and sovereignty, he 
said Indians have accepted that the Naga 
sovereignty would be with the Nagas and 
sovereignty of India would remain with Indians. 
He also said ‘we must depend on each other. 
We must admit the mistake of each other and 
we must forgive each other’ (Nagaland Post, 13 
August 2015). Interestingly, the leaders of 
NSCN (IM) now stresses on repenting the 
mistakes that they committed to be forgiven by 
God. In Muivah’s words, ‘Nagas should repent 
for the mistakes we have made before God 
only then the grace of Lord will be there’. In his 
message delivered through Muivah NSCN (I-M) 
Chairman, Isak Chishi Swu also ‘urged the 
Nagas to repent, seek forgiveness so that God 
will lead the Nagas and forgive the Nagas in the 
precious name of … Lord Jesus Christ’. This is 
indeed a complete reversal to its pledge in its 
Manifesto of 1980, wherein NSCN claimed that 
‘[w]e must rule out the illusion of saving 
Nagaland through peaceful means. It is arms 
and arms alone that will save our nation and 
ensure freedom to the people’. This pledge was 
taken in the name of God by asserting that 
NSCN stands for ‘the faith in God and the 
salvation of mankind in Jesus, the Christ alone’ 
and declared that Nagaland is for Christ. Now, it 
is in the name of God, NSCN (IM) is reversing 
them with its new ideas on ‘shared 
sovereignty’, ‘co-existence’ and ‘non-
confrontationist accommodation’. 
While there have been both euphoria and 
celebrations around the ‘Framework 
Agreement’, many substantive issues have, 
however, remained unanswered. Whereas in 
Nehru’s letter of 1946 and also in Peace 
Missions Proposals of 1960, there was concrete 
framework of mutual engagements between 
the GOI and the Nagas for realising substantive 
autonomy, nothing of this sort has been 
indicated in the recent Agreement. It has been 
argued by Goswami (2015) that the Agreement 
is marked by shift in approach from negotiation 
to dialogue through which both parties engage 
themselves for meaningful outcomes without 
rigidity in demands. But, to have impact in a 
violence-torn society like the Nagas, the 
dialogue must address substantive issues. The 
situation in Nagaland today has serious 
constraints towards sustainable peace. Two of 
such constraints are the brutalisation and 
militarisation of the society by both state and 
the insurgent groups and a corrupt local ruling 
class nurtured by Government of India 
(Editorial, EPW 2010).  Kikon (2015), one of the 
close observers of the Naga national question, 
has pointed out that the ‘future of the 
Framework Agreement is challenging’ on 
account of a couple of factors. Presence of 
more than half-a-dozen newly formed armed 
groups, which are active in Naga areas across 
the region and the factionalism and the routine 
violence that they are engaged in is the first 
challenge. Second, the growing voices of 
dissent from Assam, Manipur and Arunachal 
Pradesh against the Accord on account of NSCN 
(IM)’s dream of greater Nagalim. Third, the 
militarist and paternalistic relationship 
perpetuated by NSCN (IM) over the years 
(Kikon, 2015). Restoration of peace, pride and 
prestige in Nagaland will depend on how these 
critical issues are addressed by both the 
parties.  
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